India and the Nuclear Order

India and the Nuclear Order

                                                  India has always had a unique relationship with the international nuclear order, mostly adversarial but of late, with changing circumstances, a still domestically and internationally controversial ,yet readjusted one. As the global economy seeks to revive after the crises of 2008 and the current turmoil in the Middle East occupies the attention of most foreign policy analysts and practitioners, other challenges to global peace and security seem to have lost some of the focus that had earlier occupied centre stage only a few months ago. Those challenges still exist, and some of them, such as the uncertain future of Pakistan and the rapid growth not only of China’s economy but of its military modernization, remain issues that are, and should be, of major significance, particularly to India. Recent reports of Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the nuclear field and those that have claimed that Pakistan continues not only to build its nuclear arsenal but has started to concentrate on the production of plutonium for their weapons programme, makes the nuclear issue and the current nuclear order of greater importance to India’s security interests, and indeed, to regional and global stability than is commonly recognized.

Birth of the NPT and India’s evolving relationship

In this context, a brief review of the evolution of India’s relationship to the international nuclear regime is in order. India’s approach to nuclear technology, from the outset of the nuclear age, consisted of a dual, and what was seen as a contradictory, view. On the one hand, she spoke out strongly against nuclear weapons as threatening her security and international peace and stability and called for urgent steps to be taken towards a world free from nuclear weapons; on the other hand, she hailed nuclear energy as a possible solution to the immense developmental problems she faced immediately after independence. The contradiction, of course, lies in the fact that the same technology produces energy both for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapons. This dichotomy was spelt out by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. He spoke of the “limitless possibilities” of nuclear energy for development, while at the same time he recognized that “a dominating factor in the modern world is this prospect of these terrible weapons suddenly coming into use before which our normal weapons are completely useless.” In 1964, after Nehru’s death, China conducted its first nuclear weapon test; withstanding domestic pressures to weaponise India’s nuclear technology, India took, to the UN, the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the dangers that non-nuclear weapon States faced, both of threats and coercion. Instead of offering protection to non-nuclear weapon States, however, the nuclear non-proliferation regime that emerged imposed controls on non-nuclear weapon States, while implicitly accepting the possession of nuclear weapons by those, including China, that had tested before 1970. This was the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which today has almost universal membership-except for India Pakistan and Israel- and which had, as its original purpose, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, both to new countries and within existing arsenals. This Treaty was drafted essentially by the US and USSR at the height of the Cold War and has come to embody the restrictions imposed on the non-nuclear weapon States. India failed to get the kind of assurances against China’s growing nuclear power that she had sought; she refused to sign the Treaty as one that was not only discriminatory but in India’s “self-interest and (on) considerations of national security.” Since that time India has been a trenchant critic of the NPT as a Treaty flawed and incapable of dealing with the real challenges to the world from nuclear weapons and has worked consistently for nuclear disarmament. This outcome and the implicit threat in 1971 from nuclear armed USS Enterprise, led inevitably to India’s first test in 1974. This was followed by outrage from the nuclear weapon States and their allies, and an entire system of sanctions was imposed on India. It was not till almost 30 years later that these trade restrictions were waived by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a voluntary group of countries which restricted nuclear trade and technology transfers to countries not members of the NPT. India had campaigned hard against the arbitrariness of the regime and therefore saw the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and the consequent NSG waiver as a major achievement. This Agreement, India’s nuclear weapon tests in 1998 and the growth of Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation were three developments which have led to a readjustment of India’s approach to the non-proliferation regime in recent times. One would also have to factor in the growth of India’s economy in the last two decades as one which may have led to a greater appreciation of India’s views and security needs.

The 1998 tests

India’s first test in 1974 was a peaceful nuclear experiment (PNE), a term in use in the IAEA as countries such as the US and USSR sought to find other than military purposes for the new energy source that had been unleashed on the world. Notwithstanding her intent-she did not test again till a quarter century later-it was clear that India had developed the technology needed for nuclear weapons. India kept up her pursuit for nuclear disarmament, but after the rejection of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan in 1988 by the nuclear weapon powers recognized by the NPT and information regarding China’s assistance to Pakistan in that country’s nuclear weapon programme, the Indian Prime Minister “reluctantly” took the decision to weaponise the technology India had already acquired; in 1998, India tested her nuclear weapon capability and declared herself a nuclear weapon State. Almost immediately thereafter, while sanctions were imposed, high level discussions started with the US on the nuclear regime, which while not immediately or concretely successful, led the way to the lifting of the 1998 sanctions in 2001 and to discussions on strategic cooperation between the two countries.

The issue to underline here is that the nuclear order as it existed and still exists is the creation of the US with most countries of the Western Alliance, Russia and China following its leadership. The sanctions against India (and, it must be mentioned, Pakistan) were imposed by the ‘global community’ at the instance of the US, which saw the NPT as its creation to reflect its interests. Till the second Bush Administration, therefore, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear programme were ‘hyphenated’ by the US non-proliferation hawks, both within and outside the US Government and pressure was put on both to adhere to the various Treaties under the regime, notwithstanding Pakistan’s proliferation record and Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation . Any change in India’s relationship with the US, therefore hinged on the unshackling of the embedded prejudices of the US mind as regards the global nuclear order and, one might add, vice versa.

Sino-Pak collaboration in the weaponisation of Pakistan:

In 1998, both India and Pakistan had declared themselves nuclear weapon States; both countries had conducted nuclear weapon tests and then declared a moratorium on further testing. However, the trajectory of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and its subsequent approach to the use of nuclear weapons is vastly different to India’s notwithstanding the frequent pairing of the two programmes by Western countries, the so-called non-proliferation ‘ayatollahs’ and by Pakistan itself, in its continual quest for parity with India.

The story of A.Q.Khan is too well known to bear repetition here. Suffice it to say that Pakistan was successful in developing her nuclear weapons programme not only with the help of stolen designs and equipment, but with financial help from Saudi Arabia and technical and material assistance from China. Why China should have chosen to help a neighbor to nuclearize is a question that can only be speculated on; the fact remains that the Pakistani programme continues to be assisted by China which joined the NPT in 1992 and the NSG in 2000. This factor acts as a major influence on India’s approach to the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the burgeoning of non-state groups of extremists in Pakistan and the seeming inability of the Pakistani authorities to control what had originally been their creation, has come to constitute an existential threat to India and indeed to global security. Apart from the fact that the Pakistani weapon Programme is India-centric, the dangers of instability in that country or ‘insider threats’ to the extraction of fissile material by a religiously motivated person or a disgruntled employee is perhaps greater there than in any other country.

The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement

The third development which has influenced India’s current approach to the non-proliferation order was the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, which removed, after the waiver of the global trade embargo on India by the NSG, restrictions on India’s access to high technology which had been in place for over three decades. It was not only in the nuclear area that these sanctions hurt, but all those areas where dual use technologies were prohibited transfer to non-NPT countries. While this agreement, at the most well known level opened up the opportunities for India to adopt a flexible approach to her energy mis, particularly in the context of the debates on climate change, it was the access to high technology that was the major achievement. India’s original ambition to use high technology to solve her developmental problems came within the realm of possibility. While there were and are still many critics of the agreement, both domestic and international, there is no doubt that there has been a perceptible shift in perceptions by the international community of India’s role globally. It must be added that without India’s own burgeoning market, such an agreement may not have been reached.Pakistan has seen this as an agreement that has given India a status that would appear to have increased the imbalance in the parity sought by it with India while China has viewed it as a sign of a growing closeness between India and the US, which could affect her own aspirations for hegemony in Asia. The strongest opposition is from the international non-proliferation lobby, particularly in the US, which is of the view that the NPT and the non-proliferation regime itself has been weakened by the exception granted to India as a non-NPT State. India’s own position has shifted and she is now able to articulate those concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and equipment that have for many years caused her much concern.

Today, India, as a continuing and strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, sees her efforts towards this objective as a part of the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not in contradiction to the ultimate objective of a Nuclear Weapon Free World.