Challenges and Concerns in India’s Neighbourhood

Challenges and Concerns in India’s Neighbourhood

                              India’s Foreign Policy in the 21st century will be guided by a number of diverse considerations. Now regarded an “emerging power’ in the councils of the world, the predominant focus of attention of people in India is going to be on devising an environment, both external and internal, which will help the country to proceed on a path of around double digit economic progress, with economic growth being as inclusive as possible. In a diverse and pluralistic country like India, the very process of economic growth will inevitably generate social, ethnic, linguistic and sectarian tensions. While corruption and criminalization of politics have severely strained our body politic, adversely affected economic growth and added to public cynicism, there is presently confidence domestically and internationally, that India has the strength and resilience to overcome these challenges. We have, however, to bear in mind that with its image in recent days tarnished by endemic corruption coupled with crass inefficiency, which was manifested internationally during the Commonwealth Games, and uncertainties about the prospects for investment and growth, India’s standing and international role could be seriously eroded if we do not set our house in order.

The foreign policy challenges having national security dimensions that India will have to deal with arise from a number of issues and factors. Terrorism sponsored by radical, Wahhabi oriented Islamic groups, whose ideological leanings influence small sections of minority opinion within India and motivate groups like SIMI, is going to remain an important challenge, for at least the next decade or two. More importantly, India will have to ensure that these tensions do not put its secular and pluralistic values and ethos under strain. Developments within Pakistan, where the army establishment has for long used radical Islamic groups to promote its strategic goals, have become a major challenge for regional security, especially in the aftermath of the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The American “War on Terror” has dispersed, but not destroyed the terrorist threat emerging from India’s neighbourhood. Moreover, with its demand for energy resources rising rapidly, India will have to focus increasing attention on the Persian Gulf, where over two thirds of the world’s resources of oil and gas are located and regional rivalries and sectarian tensions have been exacerbated, following the American invasion of Iraq. In its Report entitled “Mapping the Global Future” about global developments and power equations till the year 2020, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), has spelt out trends in emerging global power equations till the year 2020. The principal finding in the NIC Report is that even in the year 2020, the US will remain the most powerful actor in the world economically, militarily and technologically. US pre-eminence will, however, not be undisputed and its position cannot be sustained if it loses its present technological edge. Studies by a large cross section of economists across the world broadly tally with this assessment. The NIC report recognizes that the emergence of India and China, as well as other new global players, will transform the geopolitical landscape in this century, with impacts similar to the rise of a United Germany in the 19th Century and the United States in the 20th century. Given rapid rates of economic growth in Asia, the balance of economic power will inevitably shift from Europe to Asia, which will become the world’s manufacturing hub, in coming decades. The main challenge that countries in Asia will face to sustain their growth rates will arise from instability in the oil rich Persian Gulf region, which could jeopardize security of energy supplies. Moreover, the NIC Report adds that the Asian Region will also face continuing challenges and tensions from terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Report also notes that facilitated by global communications, radical Islamic ideology will spur terrorism globally in coming years.

The National Intelligence Council Report states that with relatively young populations and work forces, expanding educational facilities and the benefits of globalization, Asia with 60% of the world’s population, will become the manufacturing hub of the world in coming years. China and India will alone provide 1.1 billion of the labour force of 1.7 billion in the Asia-Pacific Region. In the next half century, as the developed world and especially Europe ages,a younger and better educated work force in Asia will become the driving force for global manufacturing and growth. The balance of power will shift- particularly from Europe to Asia. It is in this context that India has to develop comprehensive policy of promoting widespread engagement not only with the fast growing Asia-Pacific Region to its East, but also with the oil rich Persian Gulf Region to its west, from where it imports 70% of its oil requirements and where nearly four million Indian nationals now live and work, remitting around $ 50 billion to India’s economy every year. This effort has to complement policies to deal with challenges that India faces in its South Asian neighbourhood, in the conduct of relations with its SAARC neighbours.

In this emerging scenario, how will the US and China, which are clearly set to be the two major competing centres of global power, view other players in coming years? Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in 2009: “Our relationship with China will be the most important relationship in the world in this century”. While acknowledging differences with China on issues like human rights, religious freedoms and Tibet, Mrs. Clinton noted: “There is much that the US and China can and must accomplish together”. In candidly realistic terms, an astute US journalist aptly described the US-China relationship as one “between ä still dominant, but fading superpower, facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides”. China’s economy continues to boom, recording a growth of 10.3% in 2010. China has spent over $ 100 billion in aid to developing countries during the past few years-exceeding the aid given by the World Bank. Chinese aid is ostensibly without strings, but is mercantilist and focused on acquiring access to natural resources in recipient countries. The United States, on the other hand, is mired in an economic crisis with unemployment reaching 10% and with a Budget Deficit estimated at 10.64% of GDP. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have drained the US Treasury,While there has been a marked improvement in the climate of Sino-Indian relations in recent years, the relationship between India and China is still clouded by mistrust. While China views improved US-Indian relations with suspicion, India retains memories of close Sino-US cooperation detrimental to its interests, during the Nixon and Clinton Administrations. There is concern in India about what is perceived as China’s policy of “containment” of India, marked by growing Chinese interest in maritime facilities in countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China’s supply of weapons to the beleaguered regime of King Gyanendra at a time when the international community was endeavouring to assist in a process of democratic change in the Himalayan Kingdom and its continuing cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear and missile development, have only accentuated Indian misgivings. China’s growing assertiveness in its territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh, its efforts to undermine India’s efforts for regional influence by opposing India’s participation in forums like the East Asia Summit and the Summit level Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM), its undermining of India’s candidature for Permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its crude attempts at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to torpedo efforts to end global nuclear sanctions on India, indicate that dealing with China is going to be major challenge for India in coming years. Despite these differences and challenges, bilateral trade and economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi are booming and the two countries have embarked on a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence. Moreover, on multilateral issues like Global Warming and in the Doha Round of the WTO, common and shared interests and perceptions have led China and India to cooperate with each other. The Indian response to Chinese policies of “containment” and “strategic encirclement” has been largely defensive and indeed almost apologetic. But, as India’s economic and military potential grow and the country’s “soft power” expands, India would need to deal with Chinese policies, by adopting more pro-active measures in its relations with countries like Japan and Vietnam. India will also have to develop by a larger footprint in its relations with ASEAN and a more imaginative economic engagement with Taiwan. In 1991, Deng Xiaoping advocated to his countrymen, a strategy of “hide your strength, bide your time,” as being crucial to enable China to develop rapidly, without being held back by tensions with its neighbours. Ignoring this advice, the Chinese have been flexing their military muscle in recent years, resulting in their hitherto docile neighbours getting seriously concerned. China has aggressively sought to intimidate its neighbours, ranging from Japan and Vietnam to Indonesia and India, with strident and unilateral claims on it maritime and land borders. Following the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai, sections of the Chinese media and academics the Chinese media went to the extent of even threatening to invade and takeover Arunachal Pradesh, if India retaliated against terrorist havens. Professions of friendship and partnership from the incoming Obama Administration only increased Chinese “assertiveness”. With President Obama accepting that Taiwan and Tibet were areas of “core interest” for China during his November 2009 Summit, the Chinese went a step further and declared the entire South China Sea as an area of ”core interest”. Territorial claims in the South China Sea were enforced using maritime power. The visiting Commander of the American Pacific Fleet was told that the Americans should recognize the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as China’s sphere of influence. The Chinese vehemently opposed Joint US-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea, after North Korea provocatively torpedoed and sank a South Korean naval vessel. China has behaved provocatively with Japan in disputes in the East China Sea over the Senkaku Island and in differences over drilling rights in contested areas. China even went to the extent of suspending the export of crucial rare earth materials to Japan, in the wake of tensions over maritime boundaries.

It is evident that as Chinese economic and military power grow, the United States is going to be more circumspect and accommodating in dealing with China. The Chinese will, in turn, claim to be a “responsible power” by periodically responding positively to American concerns on issues like nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. The Russians seem to be prepared to take advantage of this situation by extending selective support to the US on issues like their logistical needs in Afghanistan. Japan has already adopted a more assertive, China specific, defence posture. Naval exercises involving India, Japan and the US are scheduled to be held near Okinawa later this year and India is expanding security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries like Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Ministerial level exchanges with Taiwan could perhaps be initiated. India has to show diplomatic dexterity in dealing with China, to safeguard and promote its national interests in the emerging multipolar world order. China will continue to seek containment of India by its military, nuclear, diplomatic cooperation with Pakistan and its growing economic and military profile across the strategic sea lanes of India’s Indian Ocean neighbourhood. This is a reality which cannot be wished away and will have to be dealt with by imaginative economic, diplomatic and military responses. While it would be incorrect to exaggerate the possibilities of conflict with China, it has to be remembered that the Chinese respect national power and India will have to complement rapid economic growth with rapid modernization of its armed forces, improvement of communications along its borders with China and development of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Our interaction with ASEAN members and especially with Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia are essential in promoting this effort. While the Americans will maintain a naval presence in out Eastern neighbourhood and are cooperating with India in building an inclusive architecture for cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean has to be responded to by more active cooperation with powers like Japan, in the East China Sea, for the development of viable Asian balance of power.

Following its adoption of economic liberalization, India has made a conscious effort to seek closer economic integration not only within SAARC, but also with the rapidly growing economies of East and Southeast Asia. Over the past two decades, India’s “Look East” policies have visibly enhanced its diplomatic profile in its eastern neighbourhood. As a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN and as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), India has concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the ASEAN grouping, after concluding bilateral FTAS with two ASEAN members- Thailand and Singapore. It is now a participant in the annual East Asia Summit, which also includes the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, apart from the Heads of ASEAN Governments. Trade and investment ties with the countries of East and Southeast Asia are rapidly expanding.Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements with Japan and South Korea being finalized. Within South Asia, the SAFTA, though limited to trade in goods, should be treated as only the first step in moves towards free trade in investments and services, with the goal of progressively moving towards a Customs Union and Economic Union in South Asia. Pakistan will resist moves towards such economic integration in SAARC, unless there is a radical change in policies that it has deemed to be in its national interests for over three decades now. But, this should not deter us in seeking to isolate Pakistan within SAARC, if it chooses to remain negative. Pakistan will find itself further isolated, if we move purposefully towards greater economic integration within BIMSTEC- an economic grouping comprising Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand- that acts as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Afghanistan has now joined SAARC and we can work closely with it to persuade Pakistan against remaining a hurdle to greater economic integration in South Asia. Over the past two years there has been a distinct improvement in the security situation and the climate of relations with most of India’s South Asian neighbours. The emergence of an Awami League led Government headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajed has resulted in a distinct improvement of relations with Bangladesh. Sheik Hasina has dealt firmly with Indian separatist groups, which were given haven and support in Bangladesh by her predecessor, Begum Khaleda Zia. Moreover, India has come forward with a large scale economic assistance package for Bangladesh and would do well to show understanding and accommodation in resolving issues like the demarcation of the land border. Politics and Bangladesh can be volatile, with radical Islamic groups seeking every opportunity to return to the centres of power. This is a challenge India will constantly face in its relations with Bangladesh. While the ethnic conflict has ended in Sri Lanka, India will have to quietly encourage moves that seek to end the alienation of the Tamil population in that country. The situation in Nepal is a source of concern and India will have to work imaginatively to encourage all sections of opinion in Nepal to evolve a political consensus in fashioning a new post Monarchical Constitution. A quiet but major shift has now occurred in India’s approach to developments in its immediate neighbours in South Asia. Whereas in the past, India was averse to the involvement of external powers in shaping developments in these countries, India has in recent years worked behind the scenes, with the US, EU, Japan and even the UN, in dealing with internal developments in countries in South Asia, on the basis of shared interests.

There was some movement forward in India-Pakistan relations after the SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004. The statement issued at the end of this meeting on January 6, 2004 contained the following salient points: (1) “Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented.” (2) “President Musharraf assured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any form”; and (3) “To carry forward the dialogue process, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004. The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides”. Coinciding with the commencement of the “composite dialogue” process was a statement by Pakistan’s Minister for Railways and former Chief of the Inter Services Intelligence Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi in Pakistan’s National Assembly on March 10, 2004. General Qazi stated: “We must not be afraid of admitting that the Jaish e Mohammed was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, in the bombing of the Indian Parliament, in Daniel Pearl’s murder and in attempts on President Pervez Musharraf’s life”. Till this admission, the Pakistan Government had steadfastly claimed that the Jaish e Mohammed, which was declared an international terrorist organization in the aftermath of the terrorist strikes in New York and Washington D.C., had nothing to do with the terrorist attack on India’s Parliament. The appointment of two negotiators, Mr. Tariq Aziz from Pakistan and Ambassador Satinder Lambah from India, after a new Government assumed office in India following General Elections in 2004, for “back channel” discussions on a wide range of issues, with particular focus on Jammu and Kashmir, signalled that both sides were keen to seek new and innovative ways to address even complex issues.

The Composite Dialogue Process was made up of discussions on a range of issues at the senior official level. Under this dialogue process, the two countries discussed issues pertaining to peace and security, confidence building measures, economic and commercial cooperation, terrorism and drug smuggling, cultural ties, people to people contacts and also seek to address issues like Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, the Sir Creek issue and the construction of the Wullar Barrage in Jammu and Kashmir. Perhaps the most important agreement that has contributed to relaxation of tensions between the two countries is the respect shown by both sides to the cease fire along the Line of Control and the International Border in Jammu and Kashmir since November 2003. Reinforcing this has been the establishment of more secure communication links between the Directors General of Military Operations the two countries and a direct hotline between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. Similar communication links have been established between the coast guards of the two countries, while an agreement to avoid incidents at sea between the navies of the two countries is under discussion. President Musharraf visited India in April 2005 for meetings with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The two Heads of Government met again on September 14, 2005 in New York and September 17, 2006 in Havana. The India-Pakistan Joint Commission headed by their Foreign Ministers which was established in 1983 and has languished for the last several years has been revived, providing the framework for regular Ministerial level interaction, to give added impetus to the official level composite dialogue. The continuing dialogue also resulted in certain important CBMs on nuclear related issues with the signing of agreements on “Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” and the “Pre-notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles”. Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, evidently because influential cross sections of its establishment felt that “a policy of ambiguity would appear best for Pakistan’s security”. Subsequently, however, in 2002, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Head of the Strategic Plans Division that manages Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and operations, made it clear that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent was entirely “India specific”. Lt. General Kidwai spelt out four distinct thresholds for use of nuclear weapons: loss of large parts of territory (space threshold); destruction of large parts of land and air forces (military threshold); economic strangulation (economic threshold) and political destabilization, or internal subversion (political threshold). This enunciation, while not constituting a formal doctrine, nevertheless confirms what most Indian strategists have long held-that sections of the Pakistan establishment have wrongly believed that India and the international community would be unduly influenced by rhetoric indicating that Pakistan had a low and unpredictable nuclear threshold. The Dialogue Process also led to some progress in resolving the issue of demarcating the boundary in the Sir Creek area, though differences on resolving the Siachen issue still remain. But, the three years between 2004 and 2007 saw significant progress in furthering people to people contacts between the two countries, with the opening of new rail and road links. There has been some progress in expanding trade ties, though Pakistan has stated that it will not reciprocate the Indian grant of MFN status to imports from Pakistan. Following proposals outlined by General Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, there have been substantive exchanges of views on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). President Musharraf proposed that:

(1) J&K should be divided into seven regions.

(2) There should be a process of “demilitarization” in identified regions. He subsequently asked for the withdrawal of Indian forces from three urban centres-Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramulla.

(3) There should be “self-governance” in Jammu and Kashmir. He did not indicate whether this would be equally applicable to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas of J&K, under Pakistan’s control.

(4) India and Pakistan should agree to “Joint Management” of the State. He did not specify whether “Joint Management” would equally apply to POK and the Northern Areas.

(5) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in turn, outlined his vision on how to move forward in resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir on March 24, 2006. Dr. Singh made the following points:

(1) Borders cannot be redrawn but we can move towards making them irrelevant-towards making them “just lines on a map”.

(2) People on both sides of the Line of Control (LOC) should be able to move freely and trade with each other.

(3) A situation can be envisaged where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can, with active encouragement from the Governments of India and Pakistan, work out cooperative and consultative mechanisms, so as to maximize the gains of cooperation in solving problems of social and economic development of the region.

While the discussions on Jammu and Kashmir have been conducted on a “back channel” with a substantial measure of secrecy, there have been indications from reports in the media and in comments by Pakistan’ former Foreign Minister Mr. Khurshid Kasuri, which clearly reveal that there was significant progress in finding common ground on proposals made by the two sides. While the exact contours of the framework which were then discussed are not known publicly, reports in the media indicate that there was agreement on harmonizing the nature of self-governance and devolution of powers on both sides of the Line of Control. Responding to General Musharraf’s proposal for “demilitarization,” India has indicated its readiness to reduce and redeploy forces in Jammu and Kashmir on a reciprocal basis, once it is reassured that there is an irrevocable end to infiltration across the Line of Control. There also appears to have been understanding on the need for mechanisms and institutions to promote cooperation in areas like trade, travel, tourism, education, health, environment and water resources. It is unfortunate that apart from the statements made by Mr. Kasuri, there was no public pronouncement on the framework under finalization. Much will depend on the political climate in the two countries and the prospects for political consensus within India and Pakistan, for this process to resume from where it was halted in 2007.

Complementing the dialogue between the two Governments have been measures to promote dialogue and cooperation across the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir. There have been a series of measures to promote travel, trade and dialogue across the LOC. For the first time after five decades, people in Jammu and Kashmir are being given facilities to travel across the LOC to meet friends and relatives. In the Kashmir valley, a bus service has been instituted between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and in the Jammu Region, between Poonch and Rawalkot. Five crossing points have, in addition, been opened to enable people to meet friends and relatives across the LOC. Trade across the LOC has been permitted for the first time, with goods carried by trucks on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road. There are also proposals under discussion to establish bus links between Jammu and Sialkot in the Jammu Region and between Kargil and Skardu linking the valley of Kashmir with the Northern Areas, under Pakistan’s control. While the goods presently traded are restricted to locally produced products, this trade can be vastly expanded as India and Pakistan move towards their stated goal of establishing a South Asian Economic Union. There are, however, still misgivings and grievances in Jammu and Kashmir that despite the new openings for trade and travel, the procedures for such cross LOC links have been made so cumbersome and restrictive that there are numerous complaints from people, who find permission to travel, either delayed, or effectively denied. While there was satisfaction with progress in the dialogue process with Pakistan between 2004 and 2007, it is now increasingly evident that following the 2009 elections in Pakistan, the exit of General Musharraf and escalating tensions across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, there are growing differences within the Pakistan establishment over the country’s approach to relations with India and Afghanistan. The Pakistan army establishment, led by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, now seems to be asserting its pre-eminence, in dealing with relations with India and Afghanistan. There is good reason to believe that the army is now focused again on its traditional policies of “bleeding India” in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere and seeking “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. This is clearly at odds with what has been articulated by President Zardari on relations with Pakistan’s northern and eastern neighbours. With the army evidently determined to reassert its traditional role in the country’s national life, Pakistan appears to be headed for greater radicalization internally, with the State machinery maintaining tenuous control over the Northwest Frontier Province and uneasy relationships, with the potential for escalation of tensions, with both India and Afghanistan. But, as Pakistan continues its policy of supporting the Taliban and other radical groups in Afghanistan, tensions between Pakistan and the United States are increasing. As these tensions grow, Pakistan will come under greater pressure from the international community, even as radicalism grows within the country. The situation across India’s western borders will remain volatile and uncertain for the foreseeable future. The terrorist attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and in Mumbai clearly signalled that the Pakistan army establishment continues to use terrorism and religious radicalism as instruments of State Policy. While India has been commended universally for showing “restraint” in the aftermath of the 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai, questions are now being raised about whether this “restraint” is not a reflection of Indian weakness, indecision and a lack of a coherent policy in addressing Pakistan sponsored terrorism on its soil and on its interests in the neighbourhood. The Mumbai attack has also internationally exposed the weaknesses in India’s internal security mechanisms, with Chinese commentators even suggesting that the attacks have caused a setback to India’s claims to being an emerging power. No foreign policy can succeed if India is perceived as lacking basic strengths in its internal security and lacking the will to respond swiftly and appropriately to grave provocations against its territorial integrity. It remains to be seen how India develops the mechanisms, overt and covert, to deal with such provocations. While continuing dialogue with any neighbour is imperative, the manner in which dialogue was undertaken in Sharm el Sheikh caused misgivings. The twenty first century is now widely alluded to as “Asia’s Century”. As the largest democracy in Asia, India will have to sustain a near double digit economic growth, with far better standards of governance than we currently have, if we are to play a role commensurate with our size and potential in the Councils of the World.

JAY BHOJAK.....